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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
—000O000—

VERLORA CARLTON,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

FRANK HAYDEN CARLTON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANTS BRIEF

Case No. 860247-CA

:

—000O000—

PARTIES
The only parties to this appeal are the husband and wife
identified in the caption of the case, whose marriage was terminated by the
Decree of Divorce from which this appeal is taken.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of the property distribution entered by the
District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding.

At the time of the

filing of this appeal, the Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution of the State of Utah,
Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), and Rule 3 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Appellant was notified by letter dated

January 28, 1987, from the Clerk of the Court of Appeals that this case had
been assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court err in failing to enter Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law sufficient

to identify and evaluate the parties'

respective pre-marital assets?
2.

Did the trial court err in failing to enter Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law having sufficient specificity to permit a determination
of the parties5 marital estate as distinguished from their respective premarital assets?
3.

Did the trial court err in awarding a substantial portion of

Appellant's pre-marital assets to Respondent in the absence of any special
circumstances or unique factors justifying such an award?

NATURE OF CASE
This is a divorce action involving a 5-1/2 year marriage Between
older parties. There were no children born during the marriage. A two-day
trial was held before the Honorable Jay E. Banks on December 18 and 19,
1985, at the conclusion of which the trial court took the matter under
advisement. More than six months later, the trial judge announced his ruling
to counsel in an unreported conference in chambers.
Fact

and

Conclusions of

Law were prepared

Proposed Findings of

by Respondent's

counsel

(R. at 184-194), and objected to by Appellant's counsel (R. at 175-177).
Thereafter, the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
entered by the trial court without modification on August 22, 1986, together
with the Decree of Divorce (R. at 195-200). This appeal is from the property
distribution provisions of the Decree.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties were married June 13, 1979, in Garden City, Utah.
(R. at 260.)

The marriage ended just 5-1/2 years later in December of 1984

(R. at 260), when Defendant-Appellant Frank Hayden Carlton (hereinafter
"Mr. Carlton") returned from a business trip to Wyoming to discover that
Plaintiff-Respondent Verlora Carlton (hereinafter "Mrs. Carlton") had filed a
Complaint for divorce and left their residence, taking all of her belongings
with her (R. at 386).

Both parties had been married several previous times

and had children from those prior marriages (R. at 330); however, no children
were born as issue of the marriage (R. at 260).
Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Carlton was a cosmetologist in
Saratoga, Wyoming, where she operated a beauty shop.

(R. at 264.)

During

the two years prior to the marriage, she had realized gross earnings of just
under $1,100.00 per month.

(R. at 340.)

At the time of trial, Mrs. Carlton

was 49 years of age. (R. at 330-31.)
On the other hand, Mr. Carlton was, at the time of trial, a few
days away from his 65th birthday. (R. at 331.) Throughout the marriage, he
was a certified public accountant (R. at 385) with an arduous practice
(R. at 385), which serviced approximately 600 clients (R. at 441).
The parties agreed at the time of their marriage that they would
each keep their own property separate (R. at 389) and at the time of the
divorce

each

still

had

their

property

in

their

own

separate

names.

Mrs. Carlton acknowledged at trial that Mr. Carlton was "very private" about
3

his financial affairs (R. at 275), and acknowledged that they did not discuss
his assets prior to the marriage (R. at 272), noting that she first learned the
details of his holdings from the financial declaration that he filed in the
divorce proceedings (R. at 272).
In preparation for the marriage, Mrs. Carlton sold her beauty
shop

business

in

Wyoming,

receiving

approximately

$7,000.00

for

it.

(R. at 265.) She also sold a house that she had been purchasing in Wyoming,
from which she netted $10,000.00.

(R. at 266.)

She also brought to the

marriage a 1977 Cordoba, with a value of approximately $4,000.00, and an IRA
account with a balance of slightly less than $4,000.00.

(R. at 266.)

The

assets that Mrs. Carlton held, at the time of, and at the conclusion of, the
marriage were detailed in Exhibit 26-D (received R. at 335, reproduced infra
at A-23). In total, Mrs. Carlton brought into the marriage slightly less than
$25,000.00.
On the other hand, Mr. Carlton brought assets to the marriage
having an aggregate value of more than $750,000.00.

(R. at 418.)

These

assets included a duplex located on "K" Street in Salt Lake City, in which the
parties resided (R. at 271), land with a summer home on Bear Lake in Rich
County (R. at 139-141), and various securities (R. at 396). The specific assets
brought into the marriage by Mr. Carlton, as well as the specific assets held
by him at the end of the marriage, were detailed in Exhibit 35-D (received.
R. at 135, reproduced infra at A-26).
The appraiser called at trial by Mrs. Carlton, Robert R. Terrell,
testified that he was of the opinion that the MKM Street property had a value
at the time of trial of $122,500.00 (R. at 296); similarly, Jerry R. Webber, a
4

professional appraiser called by Mr, Carlton, testified that it was his opinion
that the "K" Street property had a value at the time of trial of $122,000.00
(R. at 408). While the two appraisers had no real dispute as to the value of
the "K!f Street property at the time of the trial, they did not agree as to its
value at the time of the marriage.

Mr. Terrell testified that he felt the

property had a value of $95,000.00 in June of 1979 (R. at 296), but could
offer no specific comparable sales on which he based this opinion (R. at 299).
Mr. Webber, on the other hand, based upon four specific comparables,
including two sales that he had personally been involved with, testified that,
in his opinion, the property would have been worth $116,000.00 in June of
1979. (R. at 408.) There was no evidence of any changes or improvements to
the property during the marriage.
With respect to the Bear Lake property, Mr. Carlton testified
without contradiction that the property had been worth $300,000.00 at the
time of the marriage.

(R. at 396.)

He based that figure, in part, upon the

fact that he had received an offer in that amount from a realtor at about the
time of the marriage.

(R. at 396.)

He testified, also without contradiction,

that by the time of the trial, the value of the Bear Lake property had
declined to $200,000.00 because of adverse economic conditions in the area.
(R. at 395.)
During the marriage, inflation as measured by the Consumer Price
Index caused a substantial diminution in the purchasing value of the dollar, so
that each dollar of value held by the parties at the termination of their
marriage was worth less than 69 cents when compared with the dollars they
held at the time of their marriage.

(See. Exhibit 30-D, received R. at 335,
5

reproduced infra at A-24.)
power

into

account,

Without taking this very real loss of purchasing

Mr. Carlton's

assets appreciated

by

approximately

$75,000,00 during the marriage, (See. Exhibit 35-D, reproduced infra at
A-26.)

It was Mr. Carlton's uncontradicted testimony at trial that his assets

"just sat accumulating value on their own without further investment" during
the marriage (R. at 397); in other words, the increase in the gross value of
his assets was due to passive appreciation rather than active management.
Mrs. Carlton did not work during the marriage; instead, she was
able to accompany Mr. Carlton on the substantial amount of traveling that he
did in connection with his activities with the National Society of Public
Accountants.

(R. at 297.)

These activities took the parties to fine hotels

and nice resort areas, with many pleasant activities. (R. at 348.) Because of
her husband's employment and the opportunities that it afforded, Mrs. Carlton
enjoyed the pleasure of activities not available to her prior to the marriage.
(R. at 348.)
During 1984, Mr. Carlton's professional employment provided an
average net monthly income of slightly more than $5,000.00, although he
estimated that his 1985 income would be reduced, due to his advancing age
and employee problems within his office.

(R. at 386-88.)

At the time of

trial, Mrs. Carlton was earning $800.00 per month. (R. at 327.) She testified
that while she was in good health and possessed both a degree in cosmetology
and a Wyoming cosmetology license, she did not want to return to Wyoming
because "the economy went bad" (R. at 339) and "there is a beauty shop on
every corner" in Wyoming (R. at 352).

She acknowledged that she could

obtain a Utah cosmetology license by taking a five-hour test (R. at 341-42)
6

but admitted that she had not done so prior to the time of trial (R. at 342),
which was a year after the parties' separation.
Mrs. Carlton acknowledged that during the year's separation prior
to trial, she had received more than $21,000.00 in cash from Mr. Carlton by
way of temporary support.

(R. at 328.)

From the time of trial through

June 2, 1986, when a hearing was held before Judge Banks on Mr. Carlton's
motion to terminate the temporary alimony based upon the allegation that
Mrs. Carlton was cohabiting with a male, an additional $8,000.00 in temporary
support was paid to her.

Additionally, she still had in her name assets

totaling just over $22,000.00, which she had acquired with the proceeds of her
Wyoming business and home (R. at 333 and see Exhibit 26-D, reproduced infra
at A-23). Mrs. Carlton also acknowledged at trial that, during the marriage,
she had spent "quite a bit" of money on her children from previous marriages.
(R. at 333.)
Having taken the matter under advisement on December 19, 1985,
at the conclusion of the second day of trial, Judge Banks did not rule on this
matter until July 11, 1986, some five weeks after the June 2, 1986, hearing on
Mr. Carlton's

motion

to terminate

Mrs. Carlton's alleged cohabitation.

the

temporary

support

based

upon

More than a month later, without the

benefit of either a written memorandum decision or a reporter's transcript,
Judge Banks notified the parties' counsel of his decision.

Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law were prepared by Mrs. Carlton's counsel and entered
by Judge Banks over Mr. Carlton's objections (R. at 184-194). The resulting
Decree, after allowing Mr. Carlton various offsets and credits based upon
numbers appearing in the Findings, awarded Mrs. Carlton judgment for an
7

additional

$129,246.00 above and beyond

the $22,041.00 in

assets

and

approximately $30,000.00 in temporary support that she had already received
from

this 5-1/2-year

marriage to which she had contributed

less than

$25,000.00.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The assets of these parties at the time of trial were substantial
and derived largely from pre-marital assets. It was necessary, therefore, for
the trial court to inventory and value the assets that the parties brought into
the marriage and to determine which, if any, of the assets owned by the
parties at the time of the termination of the marriage constituted marital
assets acquired through the joint efforts

of the parties as opposed to

representing merely pre-marital assets albeit in possibly changed form.

Under

such circumstances, Utah law required the trial court to make specific
Findings of Fact as to the extent and value of the parties' assets both at the
time of their marriage and at the termination of that marriage.
The trial court erred in failing to make Findings of Fact having
sufficient specificity reasonably to enable the trial court to determine the
nature of the parties' various assets (i.e., marital or pre-marital) and the
value of those various assets. Not only were the Findings of Fact entered by
the trial court insufficient to permit the trial court to draw this critical
distinction, they are totally inadequate to permit this Court to review the
propriety

of

the

property

distribution

attempted

by

the

trial

court.

Accordingly, this action must be remanded to the trial court for the entry of
Findings of Fact having sufficient specificity to enable the trial court to
8

make an equitable distribution of the parties' assets and to enable this Court
to review that distribution.
The

property

distribution

fashioned

by

the

trial

court is

erroneous because it inequitably distributes to the Respondent wife a
substantial portion of the Appellant husband's pre-marital assets.

All of the

factors consistently articulated by the Utah Supreme Court as bearing upon
the distribution of pre-marital assets militate against the granting of any
substantial portion of those assets to the wife under the facts of this case.
The resulting property distribution is, therefore, inequitable and contrary to
Utah law and must be reversed.

ARGUMENT

POINT I:

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE

REASONABLY SPECIFIC FINDINGS CONCERNING THE VALUES OF THE
PARTIES' PRINCIPAL ASSETS.
The central issue before the District Court in this action was the
property distribution.

In light of the fact that this was a short-term

marriage between older parties and the fact that Mr. Carlton had extensive
pre-marital assets, a determination of the values of the parties' assets both at
the commencement and at the termination of the marriage was essential to a
meaningful

determination

of

the

marital

estate

properly

subject

to

distribution.
Unfortunately, a review of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law entered by the District Court (reproduced infra at A-2 through
9

A-12)

reveals

that

the

District

Court

failed

to

make

any

specific

determinations on these crucial issues, notwithstanding Mr. Carlton's objection
(R. at 175-177, reproduced infra at A-19 through A-21) to the proposed
Findings. For example, the District Court found that there had been "sizable
appreciation"

in

the "K" Street

duplex

brought

into

the marriage

by

Mr. Carlton but made no effort either to place a value on that asset at the
time of

the marriage or to quantify

the amount of

(Findings of Fact, paragraph 9, R. at 187, infra at A-5.)

the

appreciation.

As noted above in

the Statement of Facts (supra at 4-5), there was substantial but contradictory
expert testimony offered on this precise issue.
Similarly, the District Court found that the parties had "acquired
. . . personal property" during their marriage and noted that this property
included "stocks and bonds in an investment account with E. F. Hutton
Investment Company," but made no effort to determine either the separate or
aggregate

value

of

these securities.

R. at 186, infra at A-4.)

(Findings

of

Fact,

paragraph

8,

The trial court also found that the parties had

accumulated "numerous bank accounts" and "certificates of deposit," but failed
to further identify the accounts or place a value upon them. (Id.) The trial
court also found that "accumulations to defendant's retirement account" had
occurred during the marriage, but made no effort to determine the amount of
those "accumulations." Nor did the trial court make any attempt to delineate
which "accumulations" resulted from assets first acquired during the marriage
as opposed to those resulting from the reinvestment or appreciation of premarital assets.
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In fact, the only effort the trial court made to place a value
upon the parties' marital estate appears in the Finding to the effect that the
"marital

appreciation

.

.

.

totals

$255,327.00."

paragraph 13, R. at 187, infra at A-5.)

(Findings

of

Fact,

Significantly, while the figure

mentioned by the trial court appears to have mathematical precision, it is an
amount advocated by neither party and an amount which cannot be derived by
any apparent mathematical manipulation of the values appearing in the
testimony of the parties and trial exhibits. Since the trial court chose not to
place values on the parties' assets at the relevant times, there exists no
means by which the mathematically precise, yet inexplicable, figure of
5255,327.00 can be reviewed or verified.
The Utah Supreme Court requires that the trial judge in domestic
relations matters involving property distribution enter Findings of Fact
valuing the parties' assets at the relevant times so as to make meaningful
appellate review possible.

For example, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072

(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court was faced with an appeal from a
property distribution in which there were "no findings of fact that fix[ed]"
"the values . . . assigned to the various items of property included in the
distribution."

(700 P.2d at 1074.)

Although the Utah Supreme Court

recognized the "broad latitude" accorded to the trial court in domestic
relations matters, it emphasized that "the trial court must exercise its
discretion in accordance with the standards that have been set by this Court.
(Id.) In language as applicable to the present case as to the case then before
it, the Utah Supreme Court held:

11

On the present record, we cannot determine
whether the trial court distributed the property
equitably. . . .
To avoid problems of this nature, we
require that when one of the parties to a property
distribution raises a serious question as to the value of
one or more of the assets, the trial court's distribution
of those assets should be based upon written findings of
fact that will permit appellate review. . . .

[TJhe gravamen of the [appellant's] claim here is that
the distribution was inequitable. To determine whether
equity was done, we must have before us specific
findings on the facts pertinent to that issue.
700 P.2d at 1074 (emphasis added, citations omitted).

The Court went on to

note that remand was generally the appropriate remedy when the trial court
fails to enter sufficient Findings of Fact.

Remand is the only available

option in this case because the Findings of Fact are so totally inadequate
that it is simply impossible to review the propriety of the trial court's
distribution of the parties' marital assets.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

is by

no means

unique

in

its

requirement of Findings from which the value of the parties' property can be
determined.

For

example, in

Martin v. Martin, 22

Wash. App. 295,

588 P.2d 1235 (1979), as in the present case, it was clear from the record
that a dispute existed between the parties and the witnesses called as to the
value of the principal assets of the parties but the trial court failed to
ascribe values to the various assets.

On appeal, the court reversed and

remanded, noting:
[E]xcept for bank balances, the evidence is conflicting as
to the value of the property. Neither the findings nor
the conclusions attach a value to the various items of
property awarded to the parties; nor does the court's
oral decision contain any valuations. On this record, we
12

are unable to review
division. . . .
588 P.2d at 1236.

the fairness

of

the

property

In the present case, the situation is even more serious

because of the very substantial pre-marital assets that Mr. Carlton possessed
and because the trial court failed to inventory and value even liquid assets
such as bank accounts and listed securities.
Similarly, in Robinson v. Robinson, 607 P.2d 550 (Mont. 1980), the
trial court's decree and property distribution were reversed and remanded
because the Findings failed to ascribe values to the assets distributed.

The

Montana Supreme Court held:
[Wjithout the required findings we cannot tell how or
why the trial court arrived at the apportionment of the
marital estate in this case. The lack of findings is
similarly deficient as to the personal property distributed
by the trial court.
Accordingly, the judgment is vacated . . . .
607 P.2d at 551.

See also. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 602 P.2d 175 (Mont. 1979)

and Schultz v. Schultz, 613 P.2d 1022 (Mont. 1980).
In the present case, the trial court held the matter under
advisement for almost seven months after the trial before attempting to
announce the ruling. 1

Ironically, at an intervening hearing on Mr. Carlton's

motion for relief from the temporary alimony, the trial judge recognized and
expressed the quandary created by the delay:

1

Such action by the trial court was in direct violation of
Section 78-7-25, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), which wisely
requires that all matters taken under advisement be decided within sixty days
except in extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the judge.
13

Trouble is, when you take one under advisement, you get
to looking at it and you get part of it there, and when
you go back to review it, you have to go right back to
scratch again and start over.
Transcript, R. at 465.

Unfortunately, in this case, the trial transcript was

not prepared by the court reporter until long after the Findings had been
prepared and entered. (R. at 468.) Thus, the trial court faced the impossible
task of inventorying and evaluating numerous assets without the benefit of a
clear recollection of the witnesses' testimony and with only the trial exhibits
and, possibly, his own notes for guidance.
The paucity of information contained within the formal Findings
of Fact in this case is further exacerbated by the fact that the trial judge
announced his ruling to counsel in chambers without a court reporter and
without the benefit of a memorandum decision.

Accordingly, the numerous

questions left unanswered by the inadequate Findings of Fact cannot be
clarified by recourse to either a verbal opinion or a memorandum decision of
the trial court.
Having failed to value the parties9 respective assets at the time
of their marriage, the trial court was simply unable to distinguish between
pre-marital assets and the marital estate.

Since the trial court could not

make this fundamental distinction, the trial court was totally unable to
distribute in a fair and equitable manner the assets held by the parties at the
termination of their marriage.

14

POINT II.

SUCH FINDINGS AS THE TRIAL COURT DID MAKE ARE

UNSUPPORTED BY, OR EVEN CONTRARY TO, THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
AT TRIAL.
Not only are the Findings entered by the trial court in this
matter not specific as required by Utah law (see Point I, supra at 9), many of
the Findings are either contrary to the evidence presented at trial or totally
illogical.

For example, the trial court found that Mrs. Carlton "brought into

the marriage . . . a 1977 Cordova [sic] automobile; real property located at
Saratoga, Wyoming; [and] a hair business and equipment . . . ." (Findings of
Fact, paragraph 6, R. at 186, infra at A-4.)

This finding

is totally

inconsistent with the unrefuted testimony of Mrs. Carlton herself at trial.
The parties were married June 18, 1979. (R. at 260.)

It was Mrs. Carlton's

testimony that, prior to that time, she sold her business and home in
Wyoming:
Mr. Liapis:

And what happened between October of
'78 and your marriage in June of '79
with regard to your relationship?

Mrs. Carlton:

Well, it grew. It - he proposed to me.
I agreed. I made arrangements to take
care of my business and arranged for my
family, and I moved to Utah in February
of 1979.

Q,

What happened to your business in the
state of Wyoming?

A.

I sold it, such as it was, and all it was
was a leased building.
I owned the
equipment and stock.
And how much did you receive from the
sale of that business?
15

A.

Right at $7,000.

Q.

Did you own anything else prior to vour
move to Utah?

A.

I owned a house or was paying for a
house.

Q.

And that was subsequently sold?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you have any other items?

A.

I had a '77 Cordoba.

Q.

What happened to the Cordoba?

A.

It was sold.

Q.

At approximately when?

A.

I believe I sold it in March.

Transcript at 10-11. Thus, the Finding is contradicted by Mrs. Carlton's own
unrefuted testimony at the trial.
More significant are the defects in Paragraph 13 of the trial
court's Findings of Fact.

That Finding — which should, perhaps, more

appropriately be characterized as a Conclusion — reads as follows:
The Court finds that the marital appreciation in the
assets which the parties acquired during the marriage
and/or maintained during the marriage, totals $255,327.00.
The Court finds that the Plaintiff brought into the
marriage and should receive assets totaling $27,228.00,
which sum should be taken away from the appreciated
asset figure above, leaving an adjusted marital estate of
$228,099.00. The Court further finds that the Plaintiff is
entitled to one-half of said amounts, or $114,049.00. In
addition, Plaintiff should have the value and assets she
brought into the marriage of $27,228.00, for a total
estate to be awarded to her of $141,277.00.
16

Findings, paragraph 13, R. at 187-88, reproduced infra at A-5 through
A-6.
As already noted in Point I, supra, since the trial court failed to
value any of the parties' pre-marital assets, it is impossible to determine how
the trial court calculated the $27,228.00 value it ascribed to Mrs. Carlton's
pre-marital assets. A fortiorL it is impossible to review the accuracy of that
determination.

It should be noted, however, that the amount is not

consistent with Mrs. Carlton's testimony, it is not consistent with the exhibit
that she offered as illustrative of her testimony (Exhibit 12-P, reproduced
infra at A-22), and it is not consistent with Mr. Carlton's testimony or the
exhibit that he offered (see. Exhibit 26-D, reproduced infra at A-23).
The still greater significance of the defects in Paragraph 13 of the
trial court's Findings is the fact that the mathematical manipulations it
contains are illogical and meaningless. Even assuming, arguendo, the accuracy
of the dollar values, what logic or concept of domestic relations law justifies
refunding

to

Mrs.

Carlton

appreciation" determined

her

pre-marital

assets

from

the

by the trial court to have occurred?

"marital
What

significance is there to the figure (set by the trial court at $228,099.00)
derived

by

deducting

the

wife's

pre-marital

assets

from

the

"marital

appreciation?" If the trial court's logic was that the wife should be awarded
her pre-marital assets plus one-half of the appreciation that was realized by
the parties during the marriage, then logic and equity would both require that
the trial court inventory and value the husband's pre-marital assets so that
they, together with the other half of the appreciation, could be awarded to
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him.

This, the trial court failed to do and in effect refused to do by

"finding" that the undisputed $100,000.00 diminution in value that had been
suffered by Mr. Carlton on his pre-marital Bear Lake property was irrelevant
(see Findings, paragraph 20, R. at 189, infra at A-7) although the trial court
apparently considered the concurrent appreciation in Mr. Carlton's "K" Street
property to be relevant. 2
What the trial court should have done, and indeed was obligated to
do in this case, was to inventory and value the pre-marital assets of each
party at the time of the marriage, inventory and value the parties' total
assets at the time of the termination of the marriage, and determine which of
their assets had been produced during the marriage and which merely
represented pre-marital assets, albeit in possibly changed form.

Even though

the evidence produced and offered to the trial court by both parties was
sufficient

to accomplish this task, the trial court's findings are totally

inadequate either to have provided this critical information to the trial court
or to permit this Court to review the distribution effected.

Accordingly, the

matter must be remanded for the determination and entry of the required,
critical Findings.

2

Since the trial court appears — however erroneously — to have
considered the passive appreciation in value realized with respect to the
"KH Street property, logic and equity would both compel similar consideration
of the depreciation that occurred in similar real property during precisely the
same time frame. By erroneously considering the appreciation to be a marital
asset and then ignoring the concurrent depreciation of similar assets, the trial
court compounded its error.
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POINT III. THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT
INEQUITABLY DISTRIBUTES TO THE WIFE A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF APPELLANT'S PRE-MARITAL ASSETS.
While a precise review of the effect of the trial court's property
distribution is not possible due to the defects in the Findings discussed in the
preceding Points, it is apparent that the ultimate effect of the distribution is
to award to Mrs. Carlton a substantial portion of Mr. Carlton's pre-marital
assets. In addition to the $29,000.00 received by Mrs. Carlton in cash by way
of temporary support, the trial court's Decree of Divorce awarded her another
$141,277.00 in property settlement plus substantial personal property. (Decree,
paragraph 10, R. at 198, reproduced infra at A-16.) Thus, from a 5-1/2-year
marriage into which Mrs. Carlton brought assets aggregating less than
$25,000.00 and during which she was at no time gainfully employed and during
which she did not participate in the management of Mr. Carlton's substantial
pre-marital financial holdings, the trial court has awarded her substantially
more than $170,000.00.

The net result is that the trial court has awarded

Mrs. Carlton a substantial portion of Mr. Carlton's pre-marital assets.
While the Utah Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of
awarding to one spouse an equitable portion of appreciation that has occurred
during the marriage attributable to the other spouse's pre-marital (or even
inherited)

assets, such awards have been consistently limited

to those

circumstances in which the appreciation in value has been attributable to the
joint effort of the parties during the marriage.

Similarly, while the Utah

Supreme Court has held that a specific item of pre-marital property may be
awarded to the non-contributing spouse if required by unusual circumstances,
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the Utah Supreme Court has never permitted the award to one spouse of a
substantial interest in either the other spouse's pre-marital assets or any
passive appreciation occurring in such assets. In attempting to make such an
award in this case, the trial court erred.
In

its

very

recent

opinion

in

Burke

v. Burke,

— P.2d —,

51 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court was faced with a
challenge to the property distribution in a case factually very analogous to
the present action.

While the marriage in that case was of more than three

times the duration of the marriage in this action, the parties had both been
married previously and had children from those prior marriages. Unlike the
present action, both parties engaged in full-time employment throughout the
marriage. During the marriage, the wife inherited several acres of unimproved
land.

At the time she received the property, it was worth approximately

$5,000.00; however, by the termination of the marriage, it had appreciated to
more than $120,000.00.

At trial, the wife's inherited property was awarded

exclusively to her without any offsetting award to the husband on account of
the more than $115,000.00 in appreciation that had occurred during the
marriage.

On appeal, the husband claimed that the appreciation in the

property constituted a marital asset and that the trial court had erred in
failing to award him any interest in that substantial marital asset.

In

rejecting this contention, the Utah Supreme Court began its analysis by
emphasizing the fundamental goal of property distributions:
[T]rial courts need to be guided by the general
purpose to be achieved by a property distribution, which
is to allocate the property in a manner which best serves
the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue
their separate lives.
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- P.2d at --, 51 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11 (footnote citation omitted). The Utah
Supreme Court then proceeded to discuss the factors to be considered in
fashioning an appropriate distribution of assets including those from pre- or
extra-marital sources:
Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be
viewed as separate property, and in appropriate
circumstances, equity will require that each party retain
the separate property brought to the marriage. However,
the rule is not invariable. In fashioning an equitable
property distribution, trial courts need consider all of
the pertinent circumstances. The factors generally to be
considered are the amount and kind of property to be
divided; whether the property was acquired before or
during the marriage; the source of the property; the
health of the parties; the parties' standard of living,
respective financial conditions, needs, and earning
capacity; the duration of the marriage; the children of
the marriage; the parties' ages at time of marriage and
of divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage;
and the necessary relationship the property distribution
has with the amount of alimony and child support to be
awarded. Of particular concern in a case such as this is
whether one spouse has made any contribution toward
the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse
and whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by
the joint efforts of the parties.
— P.2d at —, 51 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11 (emphasis added, footnote citations
omitted).
Having enumerated these factors, the Utah Supreme Court went on
to apply them to the facts of the case then before it.

At the outset, the

Court noted that "except for having urged [the wife] to take her inheritance
in

land

rather

than

cash, [the husband] concedes

that

he

made

no

contribution towards the increase in value of the acreage in question and that
the income came solely from the effects of inflation on land values."

(Id.)

Having found that the husband did not actively participate in either the
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acquisition of the inherited property or the accumulation of the appreciation
that occurred with respect to that property, the Utah Supreme Court held
that the trial court had correctly denied him any interest in the wife's extramarital property and its appreciation.

For precisely the same reason, the

trial court in this case should have denied Mrs. Carlton any interest in
Mr. Carlton's pre-marital property and the appreciation that occurred with
respect to that property during the marriage.
Another case in which the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a property
distribution under facts very similar to those before this Court in the present
case is Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982).

In that case, the

parties both had children from prior marriages and were married
approximately seven years.
Preston and
substantial

the present

for

The only substantial factual difference between
action

is that, in Preston, the wife

properties to the marriagew; whereas, in the present

Mrs. Carlton brought relatively few assets to the marriage.

"brought
action,

During their

marriage, in that case, the parties constructed a recreational cabin, which had
a value at the time of trial of $34,000.00. The parties both jointly worked on
the construction of the cabin but the evidence demonstrated that the husband
contributed slightly more than $9,000.00 to the project from his pre-marital
assets.

The District Court divided the cabin equally between the parties.

The husband appealed, contending that this distribution deprived him of the
pre-marital property that he had contributed to the project.

On appeal, the

Utah Supreme Court agreed and reversed the trial court, holding:
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[T]he husband should have been given credit for [his]
$9,310.93 contribution {together with the proportion of
appreciation in value attributable thereto) before the
value of the cabin was divided between the parties. . . .
646 P.2d at 706 (emphasis added, citations omitted). Thus, the Utah Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's property distribution not only because it
failed to restore to the husband his contribution of pre-marital assets but
also because it failed to award to the husband the appreciation in value that
had occurred during the marriage attributable to those assets.

For these

same reasons, the property distribution fashioned by the trial court in this
action is erroneous.
The Utah Supreme Court applied these same fundamental principles
in Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). That case, also, involved
a relatively short-term marriage between older persons.

The wife brought

substantial cash assets to the marriage while the husband brought "virtually
no assets."

During the marriage, the parties purchased, with the wife's pre-

marital cash, a series of mobile homes which the husband renovated with his
labor.

Each was sold at a profit.

Just prior to the end of the marriage, the

parties sold for $27,000.00 a mobile home that they had purchased for
$19,000.00.

The trial court ordered that these funds, the parties' only

substantial asset, be distributed so that the wife would be reimbursed for the
$19,000.00 purchase price of the mobile home (on the theory that it had been
purchased with her pre-marital assets), and that the wife would also receive
77% of

the

remaining

sales proceeds

(on the

theory

that

while

the

appreciation realized in the mobile home was due to the husband's labor, it
was the wife's pre-marital assets that had made the acquisition of the asset
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possible).

The husband appealed, contending he was entitled to a greater

share of the asset.

The Utah Supreme Court rejected this contention,

holding:
In making a property division, a court may properly
consider such things as the length of the marriage an<*
parties' respective contributions to the marriage. This
marriage lasted less than six years and no children issued
therefrom. . . . [The husband] brought no assets into
the marriage. . . . It was not unreasonable for the court
to permit [the wife] to withdraw from the marital
property the equivalent of those assets [she] brought into
the marriage. All that may be considered to be marital
property acquired through the joint efforts of the parties
was therefore the proceeds from the sale of the [mobileJ
home over and above its purchase price
610 P.2d at 328 (footnote citation omitted, emphasis added).

Even though,

under the facts of the case then before it, the appreciation that had been
realized in the pre-marital asset was attributable in substantial part to the
labor of the non-contributing spouse (and therefore constituted a marital
asset), the Utah Supreme Court emphasized the importance to be attached to
the source of the contribution of the pre-marital asset itself:
[I]t was [the wife's] financial ability alone that permitted
the purchase of the mobile home. Except for said fact,
there would have been no profits of sale to be divided.
610 P.2d at 329. For exactly the same reason, except for Mr. Carlton's premarital assets, there would have been no property to divide in this case. All
of the factors articulated by the Utah Supreme Court militate, in the present
case, against any award to Mrs. Carlton of Mr. Carlton's pre-marital assets.
In attempting to make such an award, the trial court erred.
Based upon the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Burke, Preston,
and Jesperson, discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it is apparent that the
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factors to be considered by the trial court in connection with property
distributions involving pre-marital assets primarily include the source of the
property; whether it was acquired before or during the marriage; the health
of the parties; their standard of living; the duration of the marriage; the
number of children, if any, of the marriage; the parties' relative ages; any
particular equities concerning what the parties may have given up by reason
of the marriage; and whether the appreciation in the marital property was
merely passive or was instead a result of the active efforts of the noncontributing spouse.
In the present case, the source of the substantial pre-marital assets
was clearly Mr. Carlton.

Although the trial court failed to specifically

evaluate the assets, it is apparent that the overwhelming majority of the
assets brought into this marriage came from Mr. Carlton.

Those assets were

acquired by him prior to the marriage. Significantly, it was his testimony at
trial that these were assets that he "acquired over 40 years of work and
practice" and that he had been accumulating them for his "retirement and the
so-called golden years and as an estate for [his] children, their inheritance."
(R. at 419.)

Thus, the source-of-asset factor indicates that Mr. Carlton's

pre-marital assets should have been restored to him.
It was the undisputed testimony at trial that Mrs. Carlton was in
good health (R. at 84), but that Mr. Carlton had a heart condition, high blood
pressure, allergies, and asthma (R. at 132).

While the parties were able to

travel relatively frequently in connection with Mr. Carlton's work, it was his
undisputed testimony that their lifestyle was "frugal" (R. at 135), a statement
that was attested to in a dramatic fashion by the fact that during the five25

year marriage, they purchased no major household appliances, furniture, or
automobiles (R. at 442-43),

There were no children born as issue of this

marriage (R. at 260), and Mrs, Carlton is some 15 years younger than
Mr. Carlton (R. at 330), who was a few days away from his 65th birthday at
the trial of the trial (R. at 331).

Therefore, the personal-circumstance

factors also militate strongly in favor of restoring to Mr. Carlton his premarital assets.
While Mrs. Carlton sold a residence and beauty shop business in
Wyoming prior to the marriage (see, supra at

15-16), it was also her

testimony that the economic conditions in Wyoming had deteriorated, that she
could not make a living in Wyoming (R. at 84), where there was "a beauty
shop on every cornerM (R. at 97).

Accordingly, it is apparent that she gave

up little if anything of value for this marriage.

This factor indicates that

Mr. Carlton's pre-marital assets should have been restored to him.
Finally,

it

was Mr. Carlton's

undisputed

testimony

that

the

appreciation that had occurred during the marriage in his pre-marital assets,
which consisted mostly of stocks and securities, was as a result of passive
investment rather than any joint effort of the parties during the marriage.
(R. at 142.) Accordingly, this is not a case in which the appreciation of premarital assets that occurred during the marriage was the product of some
joint

effort

by

the

spouses.

This

factor

strongly

suggests

that

the

appreciation as well as the pre-marital assets themselves should have been
awarded to Mr. Carlton.
Appreciation in pre-marital property can be considered a marital
asset only if it is both the product of the spouses' joint efforts during the
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marriage and a real and meaningful increase in value. As demonstrated in the
foregoing paragraphs, any passive appreciation that may have occurred with
respect to Mr. Carlton's pre-marital assets during this marriage was not a
result of joint efforts to which Mrs. Carlton contributed.

Moreover, the

undisputed evidence before the trial court clearly demonstrated that there was
no real overall appreciation in Mr. Carlton's pre-marital assets during the
marriage.

Thus, for both reasons, the trial court's property distribution

cannot be justified as an attempt to distribute appreciation perceived by the
trial court to be part of the marital estate.
In this case, the evidence at trial demonstrates that there was
little, if any, real increase in the net value of Mr. Carlton's pre-marital
assets during the marriage.

This determination can be made only by

comparing the aggregate value of his pre-marital assets at the time of the
marriage with the aggregate value of those assets at the termination of the
marriage. In order to make this comparison meaningful, the aggregate values
at both times must be expressed in comparable terms.

Thus, logic compels

adjustment of the values to compensate, inter alia, for the pernicious effects
of inflation.

This is particularly important in a case, such as the present,

where the pre-martial assets were accumulated and held by an older person to
provide a source of living expenses and enjoyment during the retirement years
when employment income will, inevitably, diminish.
In this case, it was undisputed that the cost of living, as
measured by the Federal government's Consumer Price Index, had resulted in
a substantial diminution in the purchasing power of the dollar during the
5-1/2 years of this marriage.

(See. Exhibit 30-D, received R. at 334,
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reproduced infra at A-24 through A-25.)

In order to have maintained the

same real purchasing power, Mr. Carlton would have had to have had, at the
time that the marriage ended, $1.45 in assets for every $1.00 that he had at
the beginning of the marriage.

Thus, Mr. Carlton would have needed more

than $1,100,000.00 in assets at the time of trial to have been in the same
position financially as he was at the time of the marriage in June of 1979,
when he had $761,925.00 in assets.

(See. Exhibit 35-D, reproduced infra at

A-26.)
Notwithstanding the substantial diminution in purchasing power
that had occurred during the marriage, the trial court expressly refused to
consider this factor in determining "the equities in this marital estate."
(Findings, paragraph 10, R. at 187, infra, at A-5.)

Accordingly, the trial

court thus further erred by refusing to consider relevant evidence necessary
to an appropriate determination of what property properly constituted the
marital estate of these parties and how that marital estate should be
distributed.
The appreciation in pre-marital assets that occurred during this
marriage does not constitute a marital asset subject to division both because
that appreciation was not the result of the joint efforts of the parties and
because

there

Mr. Carlton's

was

no

pre-marital

real

appreciation

assets are

at

all

when

the

values

of

expressed

in

comparable

terms

by

adjusting for the decrease in purchasing power resulting from inflation during
the tenure of the marriage.
Under such circumstances, the trial court was, under firmly
established Utah law, obligated to distribute the parties' assets in such a way
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that each received essentially the pre-marital assets contributed

to the

marriage together with any appreciation that occurred during the marriage
attributable to those assets.

The only marital estate subject to distribution

was those assets that the parties, working together during the marriage, had
created.

Since the trial court failed to make any effort to segregate and

value those assets which properly constituted the marital estate, the property
distribution is erroneous and must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The trial court in a domestic relations action is required to enter
Findings of Fact that are sufficiently specific to enable the trial court to
identify and fairly evaluate the parties' assets. In this case, the Findings of
Fact entered by the trial court are totally devoid of the required specificity.
As a result, the trial court was unable to distinguish between Mr. Carlton's
pre-marital assets (which should have been awarded to him) and those marital
assets

that

would

have

been

subject

to

distribution.

Under

these

circumstances, the action must be remanded to the trial court for the purpose
of making and entering appropriate Findings sufficient to permit the trial
court to fashion an equitable property distribution and sufficient to permit
this Court to review that distribution.
The trial court erred in attempting to distribute to Mrs. Carlton
a substantial

interest

in the pre-marital

assets and

possessed by Mr. Carlton at the time of the marriage.

financial

holdings

Neither those pre-

marital assets nor the appreciation in value in those assets that occurred
during the marriage resulted from or was contributed to by the joint efforts
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of the parties.

As such, they did not constitute marital assets and it was

error for the trial court to award any substantial portion of those pre-marital
assets to Mrs. Carlton. The inequitable property distribution fashioned by the
trial court in this case is contrary to Utah law and must be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February, 1987.

DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN

By
B. L. Dart

By
John D. Parken
Counsel for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOooVERLORA CARLTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK HAYDEN CARLTON,
Defendant.

:
: FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
:
: Civil No.

D-84-4686

: Judge Jay E. Banks
ooOoo

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 18th
and 19th days of December, 1985, before the Honorable Jay E.
Banks, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff
appearing in person and by and through her attorney, Paul H.
Liapis, and Defendant appearing in person and by and through his
attorney, B. L.^Part, and the parties having been duly sworn and
examined under oath, and documentary evidence having been marked
and received by the Court, and more than three months having
elapsed since the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint, and the Court
having heard the arguments of counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant
and having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence so
adduced, and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court

having taken the same under advisement and having met with
counsel in chambers on the 11th day of July, 1986, and having
rendered his decision, does now make, adopt and find the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were bona fide and actual

residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three
months immediately prior to the filing of the Complaint herein,
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having

been married on the 18th day of June, 1979, in Garden City, Utah,
and having separated in December, 1984•
3.

No children have been born as issue of this marriage,

and none are expected.
A.

On numerous occasions prior to the filing of

Plaintiff's Complaint herein, Defendant treated Plaintiff
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering in that,
among other things, Defendant was associating with other women,
has lied to Plaintiff and has caused numerous arguments between
the parties, all of which has destroyed the feelings of love and
affection once held by Plaintiff for Defendant, causing this
marriage to exist in name only.
5*

On numerous occasions prior to the filing of

Defendant's Counterclaim herein, Plaintiff treated Defendant
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering in that,
among other things, Plaintiff harassed Defendant and left the

2
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Defendant upon his return from Wyoming, all of which has
destroyed the feelings of love and affection once held by
Defendant for Plaintiff, causing this marriage to exist in name
only.
6.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff brought into the

marriage furniture, furnishings and appliances; horse equipment;
a 1977 Cordova automobile; real property located at Saratoga,
Wyoming; a hair business and equipment; an IRA account and
personal effects and belongings.
7.

The Court finds that the Defendant brought in to the

marriage a duplex located at 573 K Street, Salt Lake City, Utah;
Bear Lake property; a lot in Oakley; a 1977 Cordova automobile; a
1977 Chrysler Wagon; various stocks and bonds which Defendant
listed separately from those acquired during the marriage; an
accounting practice; a horse; and his personal effects and
belongings.
8.

The Court finds that the parties, during the course of

their marriage, have acquired the following personal property the
1984 Lincoln; shocks and bonds in an investment account with E.
F. Hutton Investment Company; accumulations to Plaintiff and
Defendant's IRA account and Defendant's KEOGH Plan; numerous bank
accounts; Certificates of Deposit; 6 bronze sculptures and
accumulations to the Defendant's retirement account.
9.

The Court finds that the parties acquired a one-half

interest in a subdivision in Carbon County, Wyoming, a lot in

c C o^

€

Saratoga, Wyoming, and that there has been a sizeable
appreciation in the home which Defendant brought into the
marriage*

The Court has considered the appraisals received from

both Plaintiff and Defendant, and has averaged the appraisals of
their experts to arrive at the value and appreciation in the
property on K Street.
10.

The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to

convince the Court as to any need to apply a cost of living
percentage to the assets Defendant brought into the marriage
before making a determination as to the equities in this marital
estate.
11.

The Court finds that the respective IRA Accounts of

both Plaintiff and Defendant should be offset against one
another.
12.

The Court finds that the acquisition of the new

automobile by Defendant and the value of the 1977 Cordova
automobile driven by the Plaintiff are an offset and that each
should be awarded those assets.

The Court further finds that the

parties disposed of Plaintiff's Cordova automobile and Plaintiff
used the Defendants Cordova automobile during the marriage.
13.

The Court finds that the marital appreciation in the

assets which the parties acquired during the marriage and/or
maintained during the marriage, totals $255,327.00.

The Court

finds that the Plaintiff brought into the marriage and should

receive assets totalling $27,228.00, which sum should be taken
away from the appreciated asset figure above, leaving an adjusted
marital estate of $228,099.00.

The Court further finds that the

Plaintiff is entitled to one-half of said amounts, or
$114,049.00.

In addition, Plaintiff should have the value and

assets she brought into the marriage of $27,228.00, for a total
estate to be awarded to her of $141,277.00.
14.

The Court finds that at the time of the separation in

this matter, Plaintiff took with her, less her IRA accounts and
appreciation, assets worth $12,041.00, which should be deducted
from the $141,277.00 sums, leaving a balance of $129,236.00,
which should be awarded to the Plaintiff as her share of the
marital estate.

The Court finds that the two Sandia Federal bank

accounts Nos. 08-24002119 and 08-7080911-2 in vthe respective sumsof $17,929.32 and $16,508.32, and the Valley Bank checking
account No. 01-02-2113 in the sum of $5,845.00 should be divided
equally between the parties, with Plaintiff's share of $20,111.71
to be credited against the amount owed Plaintiff of $129,236.00
The Court findsM:hat Plaintiff should also be awarded the
Saratoga lot valued at $10,000.00 and that the remaining sum of
$99,124.29 awarded Plaintiff should be paid to her by the
transfer of stocks and bonds held by the parties in the E. F.
Hutton Investment account equal to that sum of money, with said
transfer to occur on or before Friday, July 25, 1986.

A-6
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15.

The Court finds that the Defendant had paid Plaintiff

alimony during the pendency of this matter and has included said
payments into the property calculations set forth above*
16.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff, at the time of the

Trial, was employed at Life Like Styles For Men, with a gross
income of $800.00 per month and a net income of $638.00.
17.

The Court finds that the Defendant, at the time of the

Trial in this matter and based upon his adjusted gross income for
1983 as set out in his Financial Declaration Form, found that the
Defendants gross income was $9,273.00 per month and his net
income was $5,306.00 per month.
18.

The Court finds that the parties have outstanding debts

and obligations as follows:

The first mortgage on the K Street

property, a loan to the Plaintiff's mother and debts that each of
the parties had incurred since their separation.
19.

The Court finds that both Plaintiff and Defendant have

incurred attorney's fees in connection with this matter.
20.

The Court finds that Defendant has failed to convince

the Court that Defendant should be given any credit for a
decrease or loss in value of the Bear Lake property during the
course of the marriage, nor that any such loss should decrease
the marital assets.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
adopts its:

6
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded a Decree of

Divorce# one from the other, upon the grounds of mental cruelty,
with said Decree to become final upon signing and entry of the
Decree of Divorce herein.
2.

The home located at 573 K Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,

be and the same is hereby awarded to the Defendant as his sole
and separate property and free and clear of any interest of the
Plaintiff.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all debts and

obligations associated with said home and to hold the Plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
3.

Plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate property

the lot in Saratoga, Wyoming, free and clear of any interest of
the Defendant, subject to the taxes owing against said property*
4.

Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property

the one-half interest in the subdivision in Carbon County,
Wyoming, free and clear of any interest of the Plaintiff and
subject to any taxes or obligations owing thereon, and the Bear
Lake property in Fish Haven, Idaho.
5.

Plaintiff's right of alimony from Defendant is

terminated.
6.

Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property

the 1984 Lincoln automobile, together with the obligation owing
thereon; the Chrysler Wagon and the 1967 One-Ton truck; the
furniture, furnishings, fixtures in his possession; his IRA

7
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accounts; his Tracy Collins Tax Conference Committee account No*
71-29-162-9; his Tracy Collins checking account No. 71-24-049-3;
the Valley Bank 60-month Certificate of Deposit; the Valley Bank
Money Market -01-07-9727; the Valley Bank savings account No.
21-113818; the United Saving account No. 0310518089; the 6 bronze
sculptures known as First Jump Out, When Ropes Were Trouble,
Winter Help, On The Hook, For Thirty A Month and Between Right
and Wrong; his accounting business assets and obligations
associated therewith; and his personal effects and belongings.
7.

Plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate property

the 1977 Cordova automobile; her IRA account; the furniture,
furnishings, fixtures and appliances presently in her possession;
the Pagosa Bond in her name; the 100 shares of Utah Power & Light
Stock; the 100 shares of Arizona Power Stock; her E. F. Hutton
Investment Account; her First Security checking account; the gray
mare horse; and her personal effects and belongings*
8.

Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to divide equally

the Sandia Federal Bank Account No. 08-24002119 in the sum of
$17,929.32; the Sandai Saving Account No. 08-7080911-2 in the sum
of $16,508*32; and the Valley Bank checking account No.
01-02-211-3 in the sum of $5,845.00, with said division to occur
forthwith.
9.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant as

a property settlement the sum of $141,277.00.
paid in the following manner:

Said sum is to be

$12,041.00 is to be deducted from

8
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said amount for the stocks and bonds which Plaintiff took with
her at the time of separation; $20,111.71 representing
Plaintiff1s one-half of the two Sandia Federal Bank Accounts and
the Valley Bank checking account; $10,000.00 for the value of the
Saratoga lot in Wyoming; and the transfer by Defendant to
Plaintiff of stocks and bonds equal in current dollar value to
the remaining sum of $99,124,29.

Said stocks and bonds should be

transferred to the Plaintiff on or before the 25th day of July,
1986.
10.

Plaintiff should assume and pay and hold the Defendant

harmless therefrom the following debts and obligations:

The loan

to her mother and any debts and obligations she has incurred in
her own name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
11.

Defendant should assume and pay and hold the Defendant

harmless therefrom the following debts and obligations: The
debts and obligations associated with the K Street property, his
business and debts or obligations he has incurred in his own name
since the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
12.

Plaint.iff and Defendant are each awarded their own IPA

accounts, together with all appreciate therein and the Defendant
is awarded his KEOGH Plan, together with all appreciation
therein.
13.

Defendant's request that the marital estate be

decreased by the drop in value of the Bear Lake Property is
denied.
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14.

Defendant's request that a cost of living appreciation

be applied to those assets which he brought into the marriage,
before division, is denied.
15.

The parties are each awarded as their sole and separate

property, to do with as they choose, the life insurance policies
presently in force on their life.
16.

The parties should each assume and pay their own

attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter.
17.

The parties are ordered to execute any and all

documents necessary to carry forth the intent of this Order.
DATED this . j ^ Z ^ d a y of

, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

JKY/^Z

BANKS

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

B. L. DART
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, postage pre-paid, to B. L. Dart, 310 South
Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, Utah
July, 1986.
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AUG 2 2 1986
PAUL H. LIAPIS - 1956
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 532-6996

H. Otfon
1*50 Mmttty. Clerk 3rd K s t Court

ByJEli S±£LS&

Deputy Ger*

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
O0O00--—
VERLORA CARLTON,

Plaintiff,

7 T* -n - * -^

DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.
Civil No.

FRANK HAYDEN CARLTON,

D-84-4686

Judge Jay E. Banks

Defendant.
••••

00O00-

— —

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 18th
and 19th days of December, 1985, before the Honorable Jay E.
Banks, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff
appearing in person and by and through her attorney, Paul H.
Liapis, and Defendant appearing in person and by and through his
attorney, B. L. Dart, and the parties having been duly sworn and
examined under oath, and documentary evidence having been marked
and received by the Court and more than three months having
elapsed since the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint and the Court
having heard the arguments of counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant
and having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence so
incurred and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court
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having taken the same under advisement and having met with
counsel in chambers on the 11th day of July, 1986, and the Court
having made and entered herein its written Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis of GUSTIN,
ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys for Plaintiff:
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

The Plaintiff and Defendant be and they are each hereby

awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other upon the grounds of
mental cruelty, and the marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant
be and the same is hereby dissolved, and the parties are hereby
free and absolutely released from the bonds of matrimony and all
the obligations thereof with said Decree to become final upon
signing and entry of the Decree of Divorce herein.
2.

The home located at 573 K Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,

be and the same is hereby awarded to Defendant as his sole and
separate property, free and clear of any interest of the
Plaintiff, subject to his assumption of all debts and obligations
against said property.
3.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her sole and

separate property the lot in Saratoga, Wyoming, free and clear of
any interest of the Defendant.

Plaintiff should assume and pay

the taxes owing against said property.
4*

Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his sole and

separate property the one-half interest in the subdivision in
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Carbon County, Wyoming, free and clear of any interest of
Plaintiff and subject to any debts and taxes owing thereon*
5.

Defendant be and is hereby awarded as his sole and

separate property the Bear Lake property, free and clear of any
interest of the Plaintiff and subject to any debts owing thereon.
6.

Plaintiff is not awarded any alimony from the

Defendant and the same is terminated.
7.

Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his sole and

separate property the 1984 Lincoln automobile, together with the
obligation owing thereon; the Chrysler Wagon and the 1967 One-Ton
truck; the furniture, furnishings, fixtures in his possession;
his IRA accounts; his Tracy Collins Tax Conference Committee
account No. 71-29-162-9; his Tracy Collins checking account No.
71-24-049-3; the Valley Bank 60-month Certificate of Deposit; the
Valley Bank Money Market -01-07-9727; the Valley Bank savings
account No. 21-113818; the United Saving account No. 0310518089;
the 6 bronze sculptures known as First Jump Out, When Ropes Were
Trouble, Winter Help, On The Hook, For Thirty A Month and Between
Right and Wrong; his accounting business assets and obligations
associated therewith; and his personal effects and belongings.
8.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her sole and

separate property the 1977 Cordova automobile; her IRA account;
the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances presently in
her possession; the Pagosa Bond in her name; the 100 shares of
Utah Power & Light Stock; the 100 shares of Arizona Power Stock;
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her E. P. Hutton Investment Account; her First Security checking
account; the gray mare horse; and her personal effects and
belongings.
9.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each hereby ordered to

divide equally the Sandia Federal Bank Account No. 08-24002119 in
the sum of $17,929.32; the Sandai Saving Account No. 08-7080911-2
in the sum of $16,508.32; and the Valley Bank checking account
No. 01-02-211-3 in the sum of $5,845.00, with said division to
occur forthwith.
10.

Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded judgment against the

Defendant as a property settlement the sum of $141,277.00.
sum is to be paid in the following manner:

Said

$12,041.00 is to be

deducted from said amount for the stocks and bonds which
Plaintiff took with her at the time of separation; $20,111.71
representing Plaintiff's one-half of the two Sandia Federal Bank
Accounts and the Valley Bank checking account; $10,000.00 for the
value of the Saratoga lot in Wyoming; and the transfer by
Defendant to Plaintiff of stocks and bonds equal in current
dollar value to the remaining sum of $99,124.29.

Said stocks and

bonds should be transferred to the Plaintiff on or before the
25th day of July, 1986.
11.

Plaintiff and Defendant be and they are each hereby

awarded their own IRA accounts, together with all appreciation
therein and the Defendant is awarded his KEOGH Plan, together
with all appreciation therein.
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12.

Defendant's request that a cost of living appreciation

be applied to those assets which he brought into the marriagef
before division, be and the same is hereby denied.
13.

Defendants request that the marital estate be

decreased by the drop in value of the Bear Lake property be and
the same is hereby denied
14.

The parties be and they are each hereby awarded as

their sole and separate property, to do with as they choose, the
life insurance policies presently in force on their life.
15.

Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold

Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations:

The

loan to her mother and any debts and obligations she has incurred
in her own name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
16.

Defendant be and is hereby ordered t^o assume and hold

Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following obligations:

The

debts and obligations associated with the K Street property, his
business and any debts or obligations he has incurred in his own
name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
17.

The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to

assume and pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred
herein.
18.

The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do

and perform all the matters and things required by each of them
to be done herein.
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DATED this ^ ^ T ^ a y

of

, 1986.

ft-•-„
BY THE COURT:

£' 'f$a**jL
JAYVE ./BANKS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

B. L. DART
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, postage pre-paid, to B. L. Dart, 310 South
Main, Suite 1330. Salt Lake City, Utah

84101, this 17th day of

July, 1986.
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B. L. DART (818)

\l

Attorney for Defendant
Suite 1330
310 South Main
Salt Lake City, Otah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
VERLORA CARLTON,
Plaintiff,

OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS
AND DECREE

v.
FRANK HAYDEN CARLTON,

Civil No. D84-4686

Defendant.

Judge Banks
oooOooo

Defendant by his attorney, B. L. Dart, hereby objects
to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by
plaintiff's attorney in the following particulars:
1.

Defendant objects to the second sentence of

paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact in that there was no finding
made by the court that defendant gifted his Cordoba automobile to
the plaintiff during the marriage.
2.

Defendant objects to the Finding of Fact paragraph

13 in which there is a finding that there has been an
appreciation in marital assets of $255,327 for the reason that
the basis by which the Court reached this conclusion is not set

1
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forth, and as such the finding is not sufficient.

This finding

is further objected to on the basis that the calculations as
stated do not accurately compute.
3.

Defendant objects to the Finding of Fact paragraph

15, the second sentence of which should be deleted since it
attempts to insert information into the case post-trial*
4«

Defendant objects to paragraph 6 of the

Conclusions of Law in that the 60-month certificate of deposit
with Valley Bank is the same account as Account #21-105264 with
Valley Bank*

As prepared, the conclusion appears to create more

accounts than exist.
5*

Defendant objects to paragraph 15 of the

Conclusions of Law in that nowhere is it shown that defendant has
been given credit for temporary alimony suras paid by plaintiff
during the pendency of this action.

As such the final clause of

this conclusion of law is objectionable.
6.

Defendant further objects to the Decree of Divorce

insofar as it carries forward the items objected to above in the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
DATED this 28th day of July, 1986.

B. L. DART

2

_ ^ < ? *
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of July, 1986, I
a copy of the foregoing Objections to Findings and Decree

Paul H. Liapis
48 Post Office Place
Third floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for plaintiff.
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ITEMS OWNED BY PLAINTIFF PRIOR TO MARRIAGE
Verlora Carlton v. Frank Hayden Carlton

A.

Horse Equipment:
Saddle and blanket; one pair of stirrups (wide, heavy ones
on Frank's present saddle); and spurs.

B.

Household Items:
Kirby vacuum cleaner and attachments; covered wagon lamp;
ceramic cowboy sculpture; one pair of mounted longhorn wall
ornaments; a framed ink-print picture of a little boy, horse
and dog; and two rugs - one Mexican woven and one Navajo
woven, black, gray and off-white.

C.

Furnishings:
Ceramic covered wagon cookie jar; a set of carving knives;
two sets of western glasses; one set of small brandy type
glasses; a tree cup and stoneware cups in cupboard; and two
pillows.

D.

Personal Items:
A step scraper; two pair of golf shoes; miscellaneous
clothes and shoes; and three pairs of cowboy boots.
IRA account - $3,918.72; home in Saratoga, Wyoming, net sale
proceeds $10,035.60; and sale of Plaintiff's beautician
equipment and business - $7,000.00.*

E.

Furniture owned prior to the marriage - given to Plaintiff's
children on Defendant's instructions.

Said cash assets were used to acquire the following items:
1.

Pagosa Water and Sanitation Tax Free Bonds, value
$5,000.00.

2.

100 shares Utah Power and Light, value $2,550.00.

3.

100 shares Arizona Public Service, value $2,433.00.

4.

E. F. Hutton Money Management Fund, value $468.00.
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SEPARATE ASSETS OF VERLORA CARLTON AT MARRIAGE AND AT SEPARATION
Marriage
6/79

Divorce
Filing
12/31/84
$ 5,000

Pagosa Water & Sanitation
Utah Power & Light

2,550

Arizona Public Service

2,433

Valley Bank IRA

2,000

United Savings IRA (Fin. decl.)

$ 3,918

Automobile (Depo pll)

4,500

Sale of business (Depo p8)

7,000

Sale of home (Depo plO)

10,058

10,035
$24,935

Adjustment for loss of
buying power resulting from
inflation 6/79 to 12/84

$22,041

xl.45
$36,182

\* DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBff
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$22,041

JOS

Utah Department
of Employment Security

SERVICER
^an H Bangerter
rnor

A DIVISION OF THF INDU^TRIAl COMN'I'^ION ^> I TAn

relay Gardner
nistrator

December 18, 1985

32:KJ

Commission Ch^irnic
W.iltnr T Axplgai
Commission
Lonice L Nielsf
Commission

B.L. Dart
310 South Main
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dear Mr. Dirt:
In reply to your request, comparisons of the purchasing power of the dollar
in different time periods may be calculated with Consumer Price Index statistics
from the attached table. The effect of inflation on the value of the dollar
from June 1979 to December 1984 may be calculated as follows:
December 1984 CPI-U = 315.5
= 1.457

July 1579 CPI-U

7IO

1.000 . f-nc

057 " -686
Thus, in December 1984, the purchasing power of the dollar was $.686 with
respect to June 1979 dollars.
Looking at the same problem from a different angle:
A market based selection of goods and services costing $100 in June
1979, would cost $145.70 in December 1984.
I hope this information is helpful.
further assistance.

Please call again if we can be of

Sincerely,

ensen
Economist
Attachment
jm
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Year

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

Average

Prior Yi

1967

98.6

98.7

989

99.1

99.4

99.7

100.2

1005

100.7

101.0

101.3

101.6

100.0

28

1968

102.0

102.3

102 8

103.1

103.4

1040

104.5

104.8

105.1

105.7

106.1

1064

104.2

4.2

1969

1067

107.1

108 0

108.7

109.0

109.7

110.2

110.7

111 2

111.6

1122

1129

109.8

5.4

1970

113.3

113.9

114.5

115.2

115.7

116.3

116.7

116.9

117.5

118.1

118.5

119.1

1163

6.0

1971

119.2

1194

1198

120.2

120.8

121 5

121.8

122.1

1222

122.4

1226

123.1

121.3

4.3

1972

1232

123 8

1240

124.3

124.7

125.0

1255

125.7

126.2

126.6

126.9

127.3

125.3

3.3

1973

127.7

1286

1298

130.7

131.5

132.4

1327

135.1

135.5

136.6

137.6

138.5

133.1

62

1974

139.7

141.5

143.1

1439

145.5

146.9

148.0

1499

151.7

153.0

154.3

155.4

147.7

11.0

1975

156.1

1572

157.8

1586

159.3

160 6

1623

162.8

1636

1646

165.6

1663

161 2

9.1

1976

166.7

167.1

167 5

1682

169.2

170.1

171.1

171.9

172.6

173.3

173.8

174.3

170 5

58

1977

175.3

177.1

1782

179 6

180.6

181 8

182 6

183 3

184.0

184.5

185.4

186.1

181.5

6.5

U
W

186 9
1872
187.1

1883
188.4
188.4

1898
189 8
189 7

191.3
191.5
191.4

193.2
1933
193.3

195 1
1953
195.3

1967
1967

197.8
197.7

1993
199 1

200.9
200.7

202.0
201.8

202.9
202.9

195.4
195.3

7.7
7.6

1979-U
-W

204.7
204 7

207 1
207.1

209 1
209 3

211.5
2118

214.1
214.3

216.6
2169

2189
2194

221 1
221.5

223.4
223.7

225.4
225.6

227.5
227.6

2299
230.0

217.4
217.7

11.3
11.5

1980-U
-W

2332
233.3

2364
236 5

239 8
239 9

242 5
242 6

244.9
245.1

247.6
2478

2478
248 0

2494
249.6

251.7
251 9

2539
254.1

2562
256 4

2584
2587

246.8
247 0

135
13.5

1981 U
-W

260 5
260.7

2632
263 5

265 1
265 2

2668
266.8

269.0
269.1

271.3
271.4

2744
274.6

2765
276 5

279 3
279 1

279.9
279.7

280 7
2804

281 5
281 1

272.4
272.3

10.4
102

1982-U
-W

2825
282.1

283 4
2829

283 1
282 5

284 3
2837

287.1
286.5

290.6
290.1

292 2
291.8

2928
292 4

2933
292.8

294.1
293.6

293.6
293.2

2924
292 0

289 1
288 6

61
6.0

1983-U
-W

293 1
292.1

293.2
292.3

2934
2930

295 5
294.9

297.1
296.3

298.1
297.2

2993
298.2

300.3
299.5

301.8
300.8

302.6
301.3

303.1
3014

303.5
301.5

298 4
297.4

32
3.0

1984-U
-W

305.2
3027

306 6
303 3

307 3
3033

308.8
304.1

3097
305.4

310.7
306.2

311 7
3075

3130
310.3

3145
3121

315.3
3122

3153
311 9

3155
3122

311.1
307.6

4.3
3.4

1985-U
-W

3161
312 6

3174
3135

318 8
3153

320.1

3213
317.8

322.3
318.7

322 8
3191

323.5
3196

1978

316.7

•

1*H.%

%*S£

-U = CPI for all urban consumers.
«W * CPI for urban wage earners and clerical workers
Source: Prepared by the Utah Oepartment of Employment Security from tabulations published by Bureau of Labor Statistics. United States Department of Labor.

SEPARATE ASSETS OF FRANK CARLTON AT MARRIAGE AND AT SEPARATION

Nancy Carlton Note
Duplex—573 K Street
(Webber appraisal)

Marriage
6/79

Divorce
Filing
12/31/84

-0-

$ 24,688

$116,000

Increase in value by mortgage
deduction

122,000

8,387

Bear Lake Lot
300,000
($240,000 land/$60,000 cabin—1979)
$120,000 land/$80,000 cabin—1984)

200,000

Stock/securities—premarriage
(See Exhibit A attached)

210,900

Stocks/securities acquired
during marriage (Exhibit B)
Stocks—premarriage
(Exhibit C)
Checking/Savings Accounts
(Exhibit D)

137,235

-0-

60,000

10,918

-0-

130,675

83,458

54,067

88,944

Retirement Accounts
(Tax adjusted) (Exhibit D)
-0-

7,600

Bronzes (Exhibit E)
13,000

4,305

Vehicles (Exhibit F)
Saratoga Subdivision Partnership

-0-

17,500

Saratoga Lot

-0-

10,000

$761,925

TOTALS
Adjustment for loss of buying
power resulting from inflation
6/79 to 12/84

x 1.45
$1,104,791

i DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

A-26

$837,732

$837,732

